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H I G H L I G H T S
• Mechanism-based theorizing provides a basis for generalization from casestudies.• The generalization from case studies is theory-mediated rather than direct empirical generalization.• The distinction between causal scenarios and mechanism schemes is important for understanding mechanism-based theorizing.
A B S T R A C T
Generalization from a case study is a perennial issue in the methodology of the social sciences. The case study is one of the most important research designs in many
social scientific fields, but no shared understanding exists of the epistemic import of case studies. This article suggests that the idea of mechanism-based theorizing
provides a fruitful basis for understanding how case studies contribute to a general understanding of social phenomena. This approach is illustrated with a re-
construction of Espeland and Sauder's case study of the effects of rankings on US legal education. On the basis of the reconstruction, it is argued that, at least with
respect to sociology, the idea of mechanism-based theorizing captures many of the generalizable elements of case studies.
1. Introduction
Generalization from a case study is a perennial issue in the meth-
odology of social sciences. The case study is one of the most important
research designs in many social scientific fields, but no shared under-
standing exists of the epistemic import of case studies. While a case
study aims to gain insight into a broader phenomenon by focusing in-
tensive attention on a single example, it is often taken to be
a “mere” case study, and is often identified with loosely framed and
nongeneralizable theories, biased case selection, informal and un-
disciplined research designs, weak empirical leverage (too many
variables and too few cases), subjective conclusions, nonreplic-
ability, and causal determinism (Gerring, 2007, p. 6).
Gerring does not agree with this characterization, but the frequency
of these doubts suggests that there is room for a better understanding of
the nature of case study research and its contributions to social scien-
tific knowledge. This paper will address this broad issue by focusing on
generalizations from case studies in sociology. As it will turn out,
generalization is often based on theoretical ideas about social me-
chanisms, not on formal empirical generalization to similar cases.
Important similarities exist between the uses of case studies in different
disciplines, but these similarities should not be taken for granted. Thus,
the claims of this paper are restricted to sociology. How widely the
observations are applicable to other social science disciplines is to be
determined by later studies.
One source of confusion about case study research is the common
practice of talking about case study method. It would be more accurate
to talk about a research design. Case studies are “in-depth studies of
particular situations, organizations, or kinds of events”1 (Becker, 2014,
p. 2). The distinction between a method and a design is important. For
example, sociological case studies typically employ multiple methods
for finding, generating, and analyzing data about the phenomenon of
interest. A sociologist may do interviews, make participatory observa-
tions in the field, collect historical or contemporary documents, as well
as social media discussions, and analyze these materials using a variety
of methods. Similarly, while case study research is often associated with
qualitative research, in many cases some of the data sources and the
ways of analyzing them are quantitative. This indicates that a case
study researcher is not typically driven by the choice to employ a
particular method, but by the goal of a comprehensive understanding of
the particular phenomenon of interest using whatever data is available.
This applies at least to intensive case studies with explanatory aims,
which are the topic of this paper.
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Case studies can be approached from two perspectives. The first
focuses on the aims of the research, while the second is concerned with
the final product and its epistemic contribution. We could call the first
the producer's perspective and the latter the user's perspective.
Methodological literature is concerned with providing guidance for the
research process, so it is understandable that it usually adopts the
producer's perspective. However, from the point of view of under-
standing what can be learned from case studies, the user's perspective is
more appropriate. The distinction is important as the goals and the
achievements of the study might not be the same. Like all studies, a case
study might fail to achieve its goals, and in some cases, the epistemic
contribution of the study is much larger than originally planned. Both
of these situations might happen at the same time. For example, the
study might ultimately fail to give an empirically adequate explanation
for the social phenomenon it originally set out to explain, but it could
still produce explanatory ideas that are of great theoretical interest and
might be applicable to other cases. This article will exclusively employ
the user's perspective. The key question is how case studies contribute
to general social scientific understanding irrespective of what the au-
thors of these studies planned to do. The author's statements provide
valuable clues as to what to expect from the study, but they do not
determine its epistemic contribution.
The structure of the paper is the following. In the next section I will
describe the problem of analytical generalization, that is, the problem
of how case studies contribute to a general understanding of social
phenomena. The main argument of the section is that an adequate so-
lution to this problem requires ideas about what theory is in social
scientific research. The third section continues this topic by presenting
the idea of mechanism-based theorizing as it has been developed in
analytical sociology. The key contributions of this approach are the
distinction between causal scenarios and mechanism schemes and the
toolbox view of the growth of theoretical knowledge. These ideas are
put into action in section 4, where some of the key theoretical con-
tributions of Wendy Espeland and Michael Sauder's (2016) study of law
school rankings are reconstructed using mechanistic concepts. Section 5
summarizes the key results and suggests some implications of the me-
chanism-based approach to case study research in sociology.
2. The problem of analytical generalization
Sometimes a case study is just a case. It simply provides a descrip-
tion of an interesting event, process, or social object. Such a study does
not explain anything, nor does it make any theoretical contribution.
Studies like this might be valuable, as the facts described could be in-
teresting. Furthermore, the findings of the study could be used as ma-
terial for further studies. However, purely descriptive studies like these
are not the reason for why case studies are important in sociology. John
Walton formulates the more general sociological ambition as follows:
At bottom, the logic of the case study is to demonstrate a causal
argument about how general social forces take shape and produce
results in specific settings (Walton, 1992, p. 122).
This formulation contains three important things. The first is the
sociological goal of providing explanations for social phenomena.
Sociology is an explanatory enterprise, and mere description is not
sufficient. The second is the concern with micro–macro relations, in
other words, connecting local events to more large-scale social pro-
cesses. The ability to connect micro and macro processes is often one of
the key motives for doing case study research in sociology. The third is
the concern with the relation between the general and the particular.
Sociologists expect to learn something more general from case studies
and are disappointed if the study is limited to describing particulars.
From early on, social scientists have recognized that case studies
cannot produce statistical generalizations and that statistical measures
of representativeness are not adequate for the purposes of case study
research (Gobo, 2008; Small, 2009). But it has proven difficult to
articulate a generally acceptable alternative view. The early and highly
influential idea of analytical induction first presented by Znaniecki in
1930's was later seen to be based on strong assumptions, necessary
causes, and Aristotelian essences (see Hammersley, Gomm, & Foster,
2000; Lieberson, 1992). In contrast, Stake's (1978) idea of naturalistic
generalization and Lincoln and Cuba's (1985) idea of transferability, apart
from criticizing some inapplicable ideas about generalization, do not
really explain what makes some aspects of cases ‘transferable’ nor do
they provide much guidance for justifying such inferences (Gomm,
Hammersley & Forster 2000). They seem to leave the making of gen-
eralizations to the reader's subjective discretion, a move that makes the
grounds for justifying generalization from case studies even more
mysterious. Finally, the notion of moderatum generalization (Payne &
Williams, 2005; Williams, 2000) is much better at highlighting the
limitations of social scientific generalizations than describing how they
work. Social scientific generalizations do have a limited scope and are
held only provisionally, but this negative characterization is hardly
sufficient for understanding the workings of generalization from cases.
Due to these shortcomings, none of these accounts has achieved wide
acceptance (see Gobo, 2008; Gomm, Hammersley, & Foster, 2000). The
current situation seems to be that sociologists (and other social scien-
tists) continue to draw general lessons from case studies, but they do
not have an adequate account of the conditions under which it justified,
nor do they seem to care.
Many accounts emphasize the role of theory in generalization from
case studies. However, the relation between case studies and theory can
be variable. Sometimes a case study is a quite direct application of a
pre-existing theory to a case. A case study like this could be valuable as
it illustrates the theory by highlighting and exemplifying its central
elements. Illustrations are highly valuable in contexts of pedagogy and
popularization, but they do not really provide support for a theory. For
this to happen, a case should provide a challenge for a theory. If the
applicability of the theory was not anticipated, a successful application
of a theory can provide support for it. A case study can also provide a
counterexample or an anomaly for an existing theory (Flyvberg 2006),
when it shows that the theory cannot explain the case. In addition, a
case study can make an important contribution by demonstrating the
existence of a social situation that has not been anticipated by existing
theories, but for which an adequate theory should be able to accom-
modate.
All these types of contributions to theory are important. However,
none of them are directly related to generalization from a case study.
What is missing is how a case study contributes to the development of a
theory. To start, let us begin with testimony from an experienced case
study researcher. Howard Becker (2014, p. 3) describes the general-
izations produced by case studies as follows:
[M]y work doesn't produce timeless generalizations about relations
between variables. It results instead in the identification of new
elements of a situation, new things that can vary in ways that will
affect the outcome I'm interested in, or new steps in a process I
thought I'd understood until a result different from what I expected
occurred. I can use these new elements of organization and process
to direct my next inquiry. For me, that's the way social science
works.
The quote highlights two important elements. First, Becker denies
the possibility of making a direct extrapolation from one case to an-
other, as the social world has too much variance for this to work. In
addition, Becker's inferential goals are not limited to empirical gen-
eralizations about very similar social settings; rather, he is aiming to
identify general elements that would work in other contexts too. What
is articulated here is a quite general idea about sociological theorizing:
it aims to understand how social processes work and how the contexts
in which these processes unfold produce different outcomes. Unlike
many other sociologists, Becker connects the study of cases to the no-
tion of mechanism:
P. Ylikoski Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 78 (2019) 14–22
15
Like physiology, sociology explains how an underlying mechanism
produces a great variety of experiences, depending on all the other
processes whose results feed into the process producing those re-
sults. (Becker, 2014, p. 4, p. 4)
The notion of mechanisms seems to be the key element in Becker's
account of case study generalization. However, Becker does not provide
a more extensive discussion of mechanisms. The same problem can be
found in the political science debates about process tracing.
Methodologically reflective political scientists (Beach & Pedersen,
2013; Bennett & Checkel, 2014; George & Bennett, 2005) present the
process tracing of causal processes and mechanisms as crucial elements
both in theory testing and theory development, but they do not have
much to say about what these mechanism-based theories should look
like. To get an idea of mechanism-based theorizing,2 we have to turn to
analytical sociology.
3. Mechanism-based theorizing
The word of mechanism belongs to the non-technical causal vocabu-
lary of many social scientists. The word ‘mechanism’ could refer to a cause,
a causal pathway, or an explanation without explicit theorizing about the
nature of the mechanism. This casual and occasional mechanism-talk
probably explains much of the intuitive appeal of mechanistic imagery,
both in the social sciences and elsewhere. The intuitive idea can be de-
veloped in multiple directions. The literature on social mechanisms no-
toriously abounds with apparently incompatible definitions of mechan-
isms (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010; Mahoney, 2001; Ylikoski, 2017a). Some
critics (e.g., Norkus, 2005) have regarded this multiplicity as a serious
problem for mechanism-based thinking. I don't take this problem to be
fatal. Much of the confusion is generated by attempts to do too many
things at the same time and from an excessive level of abstraction.
I will set aside questions of whether it is possible to provide a general
and informative definition of ‘mechanism’ and whether such a definition
would be useful (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010). I will instead use a func-
tional characterization: a mechanism-based explanation provides an
answer to a how-question underlying a causal why-question. In other
words, a mechanism-based explanation tells us how the cause produces
its effects by describing the process by which this happens. This char-
acterization makes it possible to distinguish between simpler (difference-
making) causal claims and mechanism-based explanations. Both might
be called explanations, but there is a difference: while the first only
identifies what makes a difference to the outcome (e.g. vitamin C–con-
taining foods or dietary supplements prevent scurvy), the latter provides
additional information on how this happens by describing the key char-
acteristics of the causal process that connects the cause and the effect.
The advantage of the functional approach is that one does not need to
commit oneself to the idea that the notion of mechanism is somehow
fundamental in analyzing causation. The characterization also ties me-
chanisms directly to singular causal processes, thus making it under-
standable why people intuitively make a connection between process
tracing and a mechanism-based explanation.
Social scientists refer to causal mechanisms, both in the context of
explaining particular causal outcomes and in the context of developing
theories about social mechanisms. To avoid confusing these two uses, it
is useful to distinguish between causal scenarios and mechanism
schemes (Ylikoski, 2011; Ylikoski & Aydinonat, 2014).
A causal scenario is a (selective) representation of a particular causal
process responsible for some concrete event or phenomenon. In this
context, a causal mechanism refers to a causal narrative that describes
the process responsible for the explanandum. The narrative (Crasnow,
2017) may be highly detailed or a mere sketch, but in every case it
involves more than just a simple connection between the cause and
effect: it describes the key elements of the causal chain leading to the
outcome. This means that the causal scenario is not an exhaustive de-
scription of the causal process, but a description that captures the ex-
planatorily relevant aspects of the process. What is explanatorily re-
levant depends on what is to be explained (Ylikoski, 2011), and a
typical case study does not only focus on one precise explanandum.
Rather, case studies are rich causal narratives that address bundles of
explananda at the same time.
When political scientists talk about process tracing, they are ad-
dressing causal scenarios. The definition of process tracing presented by
Bennett and Checkel makes this clear:
the analysis of evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures
of events within a case for the purposes of either developing or
testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms that might causally
explain the case (Bennett & Checkel, 2014, p. 7).
In process tracing, causation is understood as a continuous process
leading to the singular event to be explained. To provide an explana-
tion, the researcher has to identify the crucial sequences of events and
describe the mechanisms that are involved in the unfolding of the
process. This is precisely what causal scenarios do.
A central idea in mechanism-based theorizing is the possibility of
alternative causal scenarios for the same explanandum. This gives rise to
the distinction between how possibly and how actually explanations
(Ylikoski & Aydinonat, 2014). The competing how possibly scenarios
describe the different ways in which the outcome to be explained could
have come about. The challenge for researchers is to find evidence that
could discriminate between these alternatives and enable them to make
a judgment about which scenario is the true explanation.
The other key notion is that of a (causal) mechanism scheme. When
analytical sociologists talk about social mechanisms, they most often
refer to mechanism schemes. For example, when they talk in the ab-
stract about self-fulfilling prophecies or cumulative advantage, they
have mechanism schemes in mind. These are abstract representations of
mechanisms that could bring about effects of a certain kind. A typical
explanandum of a mechanism scheme is quite abstract (or stylized). This
reflects the fact that mechanism schemes are not primarily explanations
of particular facts, but building blocks for constructing them. They are
abstract sketches of causal configurations that can be adapted and
combined to serve as parts of causal scenarios. A single causal scenario
might be a combination of multiple mechanism schemes and could even
contain mechanism schemes that have opposite causal effects. Because
mechanism schemes can be combined, one could talk about molecular
mechanisms that consist of simpler elements. Thus, any combination of
mechanisms is also a mechanism. Furthermore, abstract mechanism
schemes can be adapted to particular cases in multiple ways. The ske-
leton provided by a mechanism scheme allows many, often in-
compatible, ways of building a representation of a particular causal
scenario. Thus, it would be a mistake to assume that causal scenarios
are just instantiations of mechanism schemes.3
Mechanism schemes are objects of theoretical interest. A case study
2 Bengtsson and Hertting's (2014) ideas are an important precursor to my
approach. Their idea of ‘rationalistic generalization’ can be regarded as a spe-
cial case of the more general approach articulated here. Their approach works
nicely with cases where the social mechanism is based on ‘the logic of the si-
tuation’, but is less useful when the mechanism involves more substantial as-
sumptions about cognitive processes.
3 While there is much similarity between the ideas presented here and
Darden's (2006) discussion about mechanism schemes, it should be noted that
she does not employ the notion of causal scenarios. She contrasts mechanism
schemes with particular mechanisms, but the latter are different from causal
scenarios primarily for two reasons. First, her particular mechanisms seem to
refer to specific types of mechanisms, rather than to particular concrete me-
chanisms. Second, her particular mechanisms are concretizations of more ab-
stract mechanism schemes, not at all complex combinations of mechanism
schemes.
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might be interesting for a theorist because it identifies an interesting
mechanism that can also be applied in other contexts. Mechanism
schemes can also be represented and studied by means of formal (e.g.
rational choice, agent-based, etc.) models. These often highly abstract
models do not address any particular empirical fact. Rather, they are
used to explore the properties of the modeled mechanisms and their
combinations: what kinds of things they could explain. Here the notion
of generative sufficiency is important (Epstein, 2006). The idea here is to
demonstrate that the proposed mechanism at least in principle is cap-
able of bringing about the outcome to be explained. This is a far from
trivial task. Complex social processes involve multiple agents, inter-
dependencies between the agents, complex structural presuppositions,
all sorts of feedback processes, and the processes often unfold over a
long time. All of this poses serious challenges both for verbal theorizing
and formal modeling.
From the point of view of constructing causal scenarios, mechanism
schemes provide a menu of elements that can be adapted for the pur-
poses of explaining the empirical facts of interest. Known mechanism
schemes represent knowledge about causal possibilities: what kinds of
things could explain outcomes of a specified type. They also tell which
parts of the causal process are important for the explanatory purposes at
hand and how they could affect the outcome of the process. For this
reason they are important in the construction of alternative causal
scenarios and in the search for evidence that could discriminate be-
tween them.
Mechanism schemes are at the core of analytical sociology's account
of the growth of theoretical knowledge. According to this view, social
scientific knowledge grows through the development and articulation
of different types of mechanism schemes. This provides an interpreta-
tion of what Robert Merton referred to as ‘middle-range theories’
(Merton, 1968). Merton contrasted middle-range theories with simple
empirical hypotheses that arise in everyday social research and general
sociological theories that are more like theoretical orientations than
specific claims about how social processes work. Merton's original
discussion left the precise nature of middle-range theories relatively
vague, but analytical sociologists have attempted to clarify this by
specifying that these theories should be about social mechanisms
(Hedström & Udéhn, 2009). In this view, the core theoretical knowl-
edge in sociology is comprised of a collection of mechanism schemes
that can be adapted to particular situations and explanatory tasks. This
toolbox view of theoretical knowledge (Elster, 2015; Hedström &
Ylikoski, 2010) replaces older ideas about the nature of social scientific
theory: general social scientific knowledge does not consist of collec-
tions of empirical generalizations or highly general principles, as in the
older views, but of a growing body of mechanism schemes. In this view,
theoretical understanding of the social world accumulates when the
number of known mechanisms increases or the understanding of par-
ticular mechanism schemes becomes more detailed. There is also room
for progress via systematization; mechanism schemes should be mu-
tually compatible, so knowledge progresses as new ways of combining
mechanism schemes are developed.
According to the mechanism view, the value of case studies is
contingent on their contributions to the toolbox of mechanism schemes.
Such theoretical generalization does not require direct empirical gen-
eralization from one case to another. This makes the domain of gen-
eralization broader: the mechanism scheme learned from a case study
might be applicable to situations that are quite dissimilar to the original
case. In addition, the outcome does not have to be exactly the same as
long as it is produced by the same mechanism. On the other hand,
mechanism-based thinking also calls for caution: different mechanisms
can produce very similar looking outcomes, and the outcome might be
produced by mechanisms working in parallel. This means that although
the cases might look superficially the same, they might be quite dif-
ferent in their inner workings. And, of course, because the presence of
the same mechanism does not guarantee the same outcome, the me-
chanism-based approach makes one cautious with respect to predicting
the outcomes of social processes. This implies that while the insights
produced by the case study might be broader than non-mechanistic
approaches to generalization acknowledge, the mechanism-based ap-
proach has a principled reason to be more circumspect with respect to
direct empirical generalizations and extrapolations.
The generalization from the cases occurs through the theoretical
toolbox, and a case study can contribute in multiple ways. First, a case
study might provide evidence about a completely new mechanism or
about a new combination of already known mechanisms. In other
words, it gives rise to a new mechanism scheme or to a way to combine
existing mechanism schemes. Second, a case study might help with
gaining a deeper understanding of a particular mechanism. For ex-
ample, it could tell something new about the necessary background
conditions for a mechanism scheme or about the factors that moderate
its operation. Third, the case study might tell about other effects of the
mechanisms that could turn out to be important diagnostic evidence
about their operation. Finally, even if a case study fails to contribute to
the toolbox, it might influence future theoretical development by
bringing to the fore puzzles that show the limits of the current theo-
retical ideas.
The toolbox view also provides a way to think about how social
scientific knowledge could become better integrated. Mechanism
schemes are something various subfields of sociology (or more gen-
erally social sciences) could share. While the subfields of sociology are
currently increasingly distant from each other and develop their own
local theoretical vocabularies and theories, the shared toolbox of causal
mechanisms could provide the means to integrate the fields in a fruitful
manner. The various subfields could employ and develop the same
theoretical toolbox and thereby benefit from each other's work. This
was in fact one of the original ideas motivating Robert K. Merton's
(1968) call for theories of middle range, and some of his most famous
notions, such as the self-fulfilling prophecy and the Matthew effect,
have turned out to be good examples of mechanism schemes that have
applications in a wide range of domains of social enquiry.
4. Reactivity and rankings
A sociological case study of US law school rankings by Wendy
Espeland and Michael Sauder (Espeland, 2016; Espeland & Sauder,
2007, 2016; Sauder & Espeland, 2009) provides a good illustration for
our purposes. The authors spent over ten years studying U.S. News and
World Report rankings and their impacts on legal education. The em-
pirical data collected is both extensive and diverse: over two hundred
in-depth interviews and observational data about schools, job fairs, and
professional meetings together with documentary materials consisting
of school statistics, newspaper reports, online bulletin board discus-
sions, and organizational documents (Espeland & Sauder, 2016, p. 4).
The goal was to understand the full extent of the intended and unin-
tended effects of rankings through an intensive examination of how
they change law schools and influence the people working and studying
within these institutions. While the authors don't employ the term, they
are clearly engaged in process tracing: each of the four empirical
chapters trace the effects of rankings for one of the crucial groups in the
process (the applicants, the admission officers, the deans, and people
working in career services).
The authors chose US law schools as their subject of study for a
number of reasons. First, in contrast to many other fields, in legal
education one ranking has a monopoly on public perception, and the
same ranking metrics are employed for all law schools. This makes it
easier to observe how particular criteria used in the rankings are related
to school actions and whether the school responses vary depending on
their standing. Second, the importance of status in the legal field and
the tendency of lawyers to speak their mind make it easier to document
the effects of rankings for the students, faculty, and administrators of
law schools (Espeland & Sauder, 2016, p. 5). Thus, while legal educa-
tion is rather an exceptional, or even extreme, case to be studied, it is
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also an ideal case for observing what the effects of rankings could be.
The outlier status of the case makes it impossible to make direct em-
pirical generalizations, but the authors believe that the dynamics cre-
ated by rankings are similar in other contexts where rankings are em-
ployed.
According to Espeland and Sauder, the key to the far-reaching and
transformative effects of rankings is the reactivity of social measures. In
the case of law school rankings, the measures do not simply reflect the
social hierarchy of schools but play a crucial role in creating this
hierarchy by changing how people think about legal education. The
observation about the importance of the reactivity of social measure-
ment is not in itself new; it is a commonplace in social scientific studies
of rankings. As early as the 1970s, Donald T. Campbell presented the
following pessimistic ‘law’:
The more any quantitative social indicator is used for social deci-
sion-making, the more subject it will be to corruption pressures and
the more apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social processes it is
intended to monitor (Campbell, 1979, p. 85).
The key to the novel contribution of Espeland and Sauder's case
study is the documentation and analysis of the processes through which
the reactive effects are produced. In other words, it describes the re-
levant causal scenario responsible for the reactive changes in US legal
education. This explanatory narrative is complex, and Espeland and
Sauder themselves identify four mechanisms of reactivity that con-
stitute the backbone of their theoretical analysis of the case: commen-
suration, self-fulfilling prophecies, narrative, and reverse engineering
(Espeland & Sauder, 2016, p. 7). In the terminology of the previous
section, these four are mechanism schemes. To understand how they
work, we have to reconstruct the key elements of the explanatory
narrative provided by Espeland and Sauder.
To keep the story concise and to build a connection to debates about
social mechanisms, I will reconstruct the core argument of Espeland
and Sauder's study by using Coleman's diagram (Coleman, 1987, 1990).
The diagram helps to focus on the core elements of the explanatory
narrative: the micro–macro relations and the interdependence of the
agents. The diagram also helps us to divide the larger research question
of the study into a series of smaller questions. I will employ an en-
hanced version of the diagram (Fig. 1) that explicitly incorporates the
causal feedback loops from the consequences of agents' behaviors
(Ylikoski, 2016).
The starting point of the diagram is the observed, or suspected,
causal relation between a macro change (the upper left corner) and a
certain macro social outcome (the upper right corner). In the Espeland
and Sauder case, the first change is the introduction of the US News
rankings of law schools, and following that are the various changes in
the US system of legal education they identify. The purpose of the
diagram is to designate the necessary elements of the causal scenario
that explains how the first brought, or could have brought, about the
second. The diagram is built around the idea of action-based
explanation4: the macro changes are connected to changes in agents'
opportunities, psychological attributes (such as routines, dispositions,
cognitive schema, heuristics), and mental states (such as beliefs, de-
sires, goals, emotions), which in turn affect agents' behaviors, which
ultimately bring about the macro change to be explained. What the
enhanced version adds to Coleman's original diagram is the third
feedback arrow. It makes explicit an important dynamic element that
remained implicit in Coleman's original discussion: in the most inter-
esting social processes, the agents' behaviors are interdependent. This
interdependence is captured by the third arrow, which represents the
causal loops by which the agents influence each other through the
consequences of their behaviors.5 As the Espeland and Sauder case
shows, understanding these interdependencies is crucial for an ex-
planation of the observed outcome.
Thus, Espeland and Sauder's causal scenario begins with the in-
troduction of the US News rankings of law schools. Treating the in-
troduction of the ranking as a macro change is analytically useful as it is
a large-scale change affecting all relevant agents (Ylikoski, 2012). The
next question (arrow 1) is how the specified macro change affects the
agents. According to Espeland and Sauder, the ranking provided a
cognitive map for applicants and others who were interested in com-
paring law schools. Before the rankings were introduced, the choice of a
school was a formidable task. The applicants and their parents had to
choose from a couple of hundred schools, all of which were attempting
to highlight their characteristic advantages. This made the decision
very difficult: the schools can be compared on many dimensions, and
the decision-maker has no expertise in legal education, so even
choosing which dimensions are important is a hard task. At same time
the choice is consequential: it influences the student's career opportu-
nities. Furthermore, tuition and other costs can be a source of sig-
nificant financial strain. The introduction of rankings can have a deci-
sive impact on such situations.
The ranking gives the impression of being both impartial and ob-
jective: it is produced by an independent party (a newspaper), and it is
based on numerical scores that measure all schools exactly the same
Fig. 1. The improved Coleman diagram.
4 It should be noted that the idea of action-based explanation does not imply
commitment to some sort of reductionism. The way in which the macro change
under investigation influences the agents is usually dependent on various sorts
of structural and institutional background conditions. The same goes for arrows
3 and 4. This means that the use of the diagram does not by itself signal a
commitment to any especially problematic form of methodological in-
dividualism. It should also be noted that apart from being persons, the agents in
the diagram could also be – in some circumstances – artificial agents such as
organizations. For the multiple meanings of methodological individualism, see
Ylikoski, 2017b.
5Where arrow 3 ends is purposefully ambiguous. The behavioral con-
sequences could either affect other agents directly or via the institutional and
structural conditions. This is an empirical question; the purpose of the arrow is
simply to remind the researcher that it is important to look for these feedback
loops as they are often key to the process of social change.
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way. Most importantly, the ranking simplifies the comparison of the
schools dramatically: all schools can be directly compared to each other
without presupposing any expertise about legal education. Espeland
and Sauder call this effect the mechanism of commensuration. They do
not claim that people began to choose their school solely on the basis of
the ranking. However, the wide availability and the easy use of the
rankings made them an influential factor in choosing law school. This is
an answer to the second question (arrow 2): how did the agents’ be-
havior change? The use of the cognitive map provided by the ranking
changed how the applicants evaluated their options, and this sig-
nificantly influenced where they chose to apply. However, these cog-
nitive aspects are only the beginning of the reactive process that
transformed US legal education.
The crucial element in the explanatory narrative is the inter-
dependence of the agents, in other words, the impact the changes in the
applicants' behavior had on other agents. This interdependence is
captured by the third arrow representing the causal loops by which the
agents influence each other through their behavior. Thus, while most
deans originally regarded the US News rankings as both incompetent
and harmful, their adoption by the applicants made the rankings re-
levant to them. When the deans started to worry about the rankings, the
rankings became also increasingly important for people working in
admission and career services. The attention to rankings changed both
the content of their work and how it was evaluated. Similarly, once
applicants started to make decisions based on rankings, the rankings
became more salient for employers; now they could use the rankings as
a significant source of information about the quality of job applicants.
Furthermore, when the employers started to use the rankings (or were
widely believed to do so), the school rankings became an increasingly
important part of the market value of the student's degree. This in turn
increased the pressure felt by deans, as the students and alumni started
to demand actions to improve the school's rank. This created a dynamic
in which the importance of the rankings was amplified as increasing
number of groups started to react to them.6
This dynamic is crucial for the long-standing changes in legal edu-
cation produced by the rankings (arrow 4). Because the rankings be-
came increasingly important to outsiders, such as applicants and em-
ployers, student, alumni, and university administrator groups who were
involved with the schools started to put increasing pressure on deans to
do something about the rankings and to justify their actions. Deans
were required to provide increasingly detailed justificatory narratives
(one of Espeland and Sauder's mechanisms) that both explained the
recent changes in the school's rank and showed how the rank could be
maintained or improved in the future. These attempts to improve the
school's standing involved, among other things, changes in how stu-
dents were admitted, how the schools utilized their resources, to whom
the schools targeted their marketing, and how the career services ad-
vised fresh graduates. The structural changes in US legal education
generated by the rankings are results of the schools' attempts to im-
prove their relative position in the rankings. These effects include
transformations of the legal curriculum, changes in the composition of
the student body, the decreasing work morale of school employees, an
increasing similarity between schools, and increased status competition
between the schools (Espeland & Sauder, 2016, Chapter 7).
What are the general lessons that can be learned from this causal
narrative? It is clear that observations about US law schools cannot be
directly generalized to other educational fields or other domains where
rankings are employed. The case study does not identify empirical gen-
eralizations or theoretical laws about the effects of rankings. In other
words, one does not generalize the whole causal scenario. Espeland and
Sauder's own suggestion is that they identify some relevant mechanisms
of reactivity. To make their idea clear, they introduce a distinction be-
tween mechanisms and their effects (Espeland & Sauder, 2007, p. 33):
the same mechanisms might have different effects depending on context,
and similar effects could be produced by different mechanisms. In other
words, what they call mechanisms identify crucial elements of the causal
process that influence whether reactive effects are produced, what those
effects are, and how strong they are. The generalization is that these
elements are important, not that they will always produce similar results.
In the vocabulary of analytical sociology, these mechanisms are (sketches
of) mechanism schemes. Their instances are crucial parts of the causal
process studied, and they are the elements of the causal scenario that a
sociologist typically generalizes from the case study.
Consider first the mechanism of commensuration (Espeland & Sauder,
2016, pp. 28–30) which is a precondition for any reactive effects of
rankings: if the relevant agents are not facing a difficult decision-making
situation, they do not need help from the rankings; if they do not trust the
source of the rankings, they will not make use of it; and if similar cog-
nitive tools were already available, the effects of the new ranking would
be much smaller. Clearly, this is one crucial element of the causal nar-
rative about the effects of rankings. It links the macro change (the in-
troduction of the rankings) to local decision-making processes of relevant
agents by showing how the rankings can influence their behavior. A
more detailed study of this mechanism helps to articulate some of the
conditions under which the rankings could have a reactive effect.
Consider next the mechanism of justificatory narrative (Espeland &
Sauder, 2016, pp. 36–38). If the deans did not feel the external pressure
to be accountable, the rankings would not have had the effects they did.
Depending on the position of the school in the rankings, the demands
on the narrative are different; thus, the narrative is a crucial variable to
look at when considering how deans (or other relevant decision-makers)
change institutional practices. The mechanism of narrative clearly
modulates the effect of rankings and plays an important role in the
causal scenario. It can also be expected that something similar will
happen in other contexts where rankings are employed, so it makes
sense to articulate this to a more explicit mechanism scheme.
Finally, reverse engineering (Espeland & Sauder, 2016, pp. 33–35)
provides yet another mechanism that plays a crucial role in the causal
scenario: only if the key agents (such as the deans) can figure out how
the rankings work will it be possible for them to take measures that
might improve the position of their school in the rankings. In other
words, one cannot game the system if one does not know the rules.
Furthermore, without the possibility of reverse engineering, some self-
fulfilling effects of the rankings would be prevented. Again, the idea of
reverse engineering provides an important insight into how rankings
work, not only in this particular case, but also in others. Thus, it makes
sense to regard the authors’ conception of reverse engineering as a
(basis for) causal schema that can have various applications.
Together these three mechanisms provide a kind of checklist of me-
chanisms for analyzing reactive processes: if they cannot be found, the re-
active effects are missing (or some alternative mechanisms for reactivity
would have to be in place). Furthermore, the strength of the reactive effects
will depend on the details of the mechanism. In other words, aspects such as
the gravity of the decision, the uniqueness of the cognitive aid provided, the
intensity of the pressure for justificatory narratives, and the transparency of
the ranking methodology all affect how the reactive effects are generated.
Thus, for example, we could predict that when there are multiple prominent
rankings available and these rankings are based on different principles, their
reactive effects would be much less pronounced. This is because a single
ranking in a multiple-ranking world would have less influence on relevant
parties, and the signal provided by multiple rankings would be a more
‘noisy’ target to be reverse engineered.
All this suggests that these three mechanisms are important parts of
the causal scenario that explains the effects of rankings on US law
schools. They are crucial, difference-making parts of the causal narrative.
Furthermore, in the light of the above reconstruction, they are pivotal in
connecting macro changes to micro-scale individual and organizational
6 In addition, as deans started to improve the rank of their school by gaming
the system, the US News team was forced to adopt counter-measures and to
change the principles by which the performance scores are composed.
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behavioral changes. While they might not be fully articulated mechanism
schemes, they at least identify some crucial features of the need for
mechanism schemes to explain the reactivity to rankings.
While the mechanisms of commensuration, narrative, and reverse
engineering are especially important in the context of rankings (and other
measures of accountability), the study also contributes to a more general
toolbox of social mechanisms. One of the most well-known social me-
chanisms is the above-mentioned self-fulfilling prophecy (Biggs, 2009;
Merton, 1968). However, the label only identifies a particular kind of ef-
fect: to be actually explanatory, the notion presupposes an idea of how the
self-fulfilling outcome is produced. As it turns out, this can happen in
many different ways, in other words, through alternative causal me-
chanisms. Espeland and Sauder define the self-fulfilling prophecy as a si-
tuation in which “an expectation, once defined as real, amplifies or con-
firms the prophecy's effect” (2016, p. 30), and their case study contributes
to the literature by identifying four different self-fulfilling mechanisms:
1) The school rankings may magnify statistically insignificant differ-
ences in scores by influencing future scores in the same direction.
For example, the school's rank might change due to a measurement
error in the raw scores, but the resulting change in rankings affects
the number and quality of applications a school receives and the
proportion of accepted students who attend that school. Thus, a
small technical difference between schools could be amplified to
become a real difference (Espeland & Sauder, 2016, p. 31).
2) Earlier rankings may directly influence later ones. An important
component of the US News rankings is the reputation score. There are
190 accredited law schools, so it is impossible for the respondents of
the reputation survey to have detailed knowledge about most of
them. In these circumstances it is plausible to assume that they make
their judgments based on a school's reputation, which is mostly based
on its earlier ranking position (Espeland & Sauder, 2016, p. 31).
3) The rankings may influence the school's resources. If other bench-
marks are lacking, university administrators employ rankings in
resource allocation, and the consequences of a change in the rank-
ings might well turn out to be self-fulfilling, as the school's oppor-
tunities to improve or maintain its rank in the future are highly
dependent on available resources (Espeland & Sauder, 2016, p. 32).
4) The rankings encourage the schools to revise their profiles and practices
to match the ranking criteria. This makes the conception of legal edu-
cation embedded in the ranking criteria increasingly important. This
happens especially when the schools adopt improvement in rankings as
an explicit goal. By responding to rankings, the schools reinforce the
validity of the measure (Espeland & Sauder, 2016, pp. 32–33).
Even if one could doubt their explanatory importance in this particular
case study, these mechanisms are contributions to an expanding toolbox of
mechanism schemes underlying self-fulfilling prophecy effects. Thus, while
it is not a new idea that reactivity may involve self-fulfilling prophecies, the
more detailed accounts of the alternative mechanisms that could produce
these effects are welcome contributions to the theoretical toolbox.
All this suggests that although Espeland and Sauder are not self-iden-
tified analytical sociologists, their account is perfectly compatible with an
analytical sociology account, as shown by the fact that the key concepts of
analytical sociology can be utilized to reconstruct the central elements of
their explanatory narrative. Furthermore, the results seem to align with
Becker's ideas quoted earlier. Naturally, the short summary given here
does not capture everything that is interesting and possibly generalizable
from their rich case study. However, it suggests that the idea of me-
chanism-based theorizing captures something important about the way in
which sociologists learn more general lessons from case studies.
5. Conclusion: learning from the case
In this article I have argued that the general lessons sociologists draw
from explanatory case studies, like that of Espeland and Sauder, are not
direct empirical generalizations to similar cases. The unique and dis-
tinctive features of US law schools and their rankings make them a highly
unlikely source of direct empirical generalizations. A concern like this
does not explain why people studying the effects of rankings even outside
higher education find the study important. Thus, while similar cases
might be found, the analytical focus of sociologists is not directed, or
limited, to such cases. Sociologists are looking for ideas about social
mechanisms that could in principle have a much wider application. For
those who are studying the effects of rankings in the context of higher
education, the study provides a constellation of social mechanisms (e.g.
commensuration, narrative, reverse engineering) that are relevant to
other cases, although the specific effects might be different. And while
this specific constellation of mechanisms might be missing outside the
context of higher education, the individual mechanisms could still be
highly relevant for understanding how rankings work. Furthermore, I
have argued that conceptual tools – such as the distinction between
causal scenarios and mechanism schemes – developed in the context of
analytical sociology are useful in reconstructing what is happening when
sociologists make general inferences from case studies.
Direct empirical generalization from case studies is tricky, and the
mechanism-based approach does not change this widely acknowledged
fact. It does not suggest that there is some sort of algorithmic formula
that guarantees successful generalization or extrapolation to other cases.
Earlier accounts of generalization have been failures mainly because they
have not been able to provide a convincing replacement for the lack of
such a formula. Furthermore, these failures to legitimize generalization
from case studies have raised more general doubts about the social sci-
entific relevance of case studies. The advantage of the mechanism-based
approach is that it abandons the pursuit of the direct justification of
empirical generalizations and replaces it with a reconstruction of how
sociologists reason from cases. While the idea that generalization in-
volves theory is hardly new, the mechanism-based account provides a
relatively precise account of such theorizing. The case studies are im-
portant not because they contribute to a highly abstract general theory or
suggest individual concepts that can themselves be generalized, but be-
cause they provide elements that can play a crucial role in causal nar-
ratives about other concrete cases. In the vocabulary of analytical so-
ciology, they provide mechanism schemes that can serve as building
blocks of causal scenarios. An account like this is important not only
because it helps us to understand how sociologists learn from cases, but
also because it provides a rationale for why case studies are important.
According to the mechanism-based approach, case studies are im-
portant in sociology because they are an important source of ideas for
middle-range theories about social mechanisms. The case studies are
also important for testing whether mechanistic presuppositions of the-
oretical hypotheses are fulfilled. Social sciences study historically
changing complex causal configurations, so in-depth studies of parti-
cular causal processes are necessary. From this perspective, many so-
ciologists doing case study research might miss the full potential of
their studies. Sociologists quite often talk about sensitizing concepts
(Blumer, 1954) when they describe what they have learned from ex-
emplary case studies. This notion seems to capture the idea that a good
case study provides some theoretical ideas that can be fruitfully adapted
to at least some other cases.7 For example, someone could characterize
Espeland and Sauder's notions of commensuration, narrative, and re-
verse engineering as sensitizing concepts. While this is right as far it
7 In Blumer's original discussion, the opposite of a sensitizing concept is a
definitive concept that “refers precisely to what is common to a class of objects,
by the aid of a clear definition in terms of attributes or fixed bench marks”
(Blumer, 1954, p. 7). He argues that “every object of our consideration –
whether a person, group, institution, practice or what not – has a distinctive,
particular or unique character and lies in a context of a similar distinctive
character” (Blumer, 1954, p. 7), which forces us to employ sensitizing concepts
that only provide general guidance, not definitive essences.
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goes, this way of thinking leads to a quite impoverished way of cashing
out their contribution: these notions are more than just pointers to
potentially interesting things. The mechanism-based account seems to
provide a better grasp of what they are offering. From this point of view
the highly impoverished conception of a theory – that a theory is just a
heuristic concept – which is increasingly popular in some areas of so-
ciology (such as science and technology studies), leads to case studies
that are less insightful than they could be and to the continuation of a
very loose way of generalizing from particular studies. The adoption of
a more mechanism-based approach to theorizing could improve socio-
logical practice both by increasing attention to explicit theorizing and
by decreasing the temptation to engage in vague generalization.
Naturally, the account presented in this paper does not demon-
strate that all generalization in sociology occurs through mechanism
schemes. There could be other ways. It should also be recognized that
this approach does not guarantee producing the rich and convincing
results as were demonstrated in Espeland and Sauder's exemplary and
highly influential sociological case study. Furthermore, it should be
recognized that the notion of social mechanism should be further
developed. One promising avenue toward articulating the action-
based mechanisms found in Espeland and Sauder's study is the idea of
the logic of situation (Bengtsson & Hertting, 2014; Morgan, 2012).
Sociologists (and economists) are often interested not so much in in-
dividual agents' beliefs or preferences, but in how the changes in op-
portunities or available information affect the behaviors of larger
groups of agents. The notion of the logic of situation provides an in-
teresting bridge between formal modeling and case study research. In
principle, both should be contributions to the same project of theory
development, but in practice the two communities seem to live in
quite different worlds.8
Finally, the concern remains whether these ideas about case study
research apply outside sociology. Here we should distinguish be-
tween two different questions. The first concerns the general ap-
plicability of mechanism-based thinking and the second, the role
case studies have in different fields. The answer to the first question
is positive. One of the advantages of mechanism-based thinking is
that it helps to build bridges between different disciplines and re-
search methodologies. It is not tailored to a specific discipline or
research design. Thus, one can expect that, for example, the dis-
tinction between causal scenarios and mechanism schemes is ap-
plicable to the other social sciences.9 The second question is more
difficult. Other fields could be less theory- and explanation-oriented
than sociology, and the motivation for doing case studies might be
different. This is an issue that must be decided on a case-by-case
basis.10
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